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ARTICLE
A ONE-TERM TORT REFORM TALE:
VICTIMIZING THE VULNERABLE
ANDREW F. POPPER*
During its spring 1997 term, Congress passed the Volunteer Protection
Act and considered but did not pass the Biomaterials Access Assurance
Act of 1997. The Volunteer Protection Act provides a wide range of tort
immunities to volunteers working for charitable organizations. The Bioma-
terials Access Assurance Act would have provided tort immunity to
biomaterials producers. In this Article, the author examines the origins
and possible implications of both these tort reform proposals from a
class-based perspective and within the broader context of the ongoing tort
reform debate. The author concludes that both of these proposals ulti-
mately would harm individuals in vulnerable positions: those in need of
volunteer services and those dependent on certain medical devices.
During the spring 1997 term of Congress, tort reformers once
again pursued those elusive, sweeping legislative rewards avail-
able only at the federal level.' As has been the case each year
since 1983,2 comprehensive legislation regarding product liabil-
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. During the
spring 1997 term of Congress, the author testified before the House Committee on the
Judiciary regarding tort immunity for volunteers, and before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Committee on
Commerce regarding immunity for suppliers of raw materials to the biomaterials
industry. This Article is based on the author's testimony, observations, and reactions
to those hearings. The views expressed are the author's, not those of American
University or any other individual or organization.
' Proponents of tort reform attempted this without abandoning similar efforts in state
legislatures. At least 25 states have, by legislation or judicial action, limited the
capacity of injured plaintiffs to use the courts to secure redress. See BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1618-19 (1996). For examples of recent state tort reform,
see H.B. 637, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 522; H.B. 18, 1996 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1 (West);
and H.E.A. 1741, 1995 Ind. Legis. Serv. 278 (West); see also Beth Rodgers, Legal
Reform-At the Expense of Federalism?: House Bill 956, Common Sense Civil Justice
Reform Act and Senate Bill 565, Product Liability Reform Act, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv.
513, 522 (1996) ("All fifty states have enacted changes to the basic structure of tort
law."). Further, the American Law Institute has finished a draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, that embodies numerous aspects of the tort reform agenda, such as
the elimination of strict liability for design defects. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (Proposed First Draft 1997); see also Marshall S. Shapo, In
Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 631 (1995).
2 The first generic tort reform bill of consequence was S. 44, 98th Cong. (1983). This
legislation would have rewritten the field in all areas, but most particularly with respect
to punitive damages. Subsequent, comparable legislation includes S. 966, 105th Cong.
(1997); S. 886, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 648, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 543, 105th Cong.
(1997) (enacted); H.R. 872, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 364, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 956,
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ity and tort law failed.3 Of several narrow legislative initiatives,
only one,4 granting tort immunity to volunteers, was enacted.
The passage of this one bill is significant, however, as it severely
restricts the ability of injured consumers to pursue claims in
various courts. Comment on the passage of this law, as well as
on the near adoption of a second narrowly focused bill regarding
biomaterials,5 is thus timely.
This Article criticizes proposed changes in the system of civil
liability. Part I examines the political and economic alignments
behind tort reform, specifically with reference to the aforemen-
tioned legislative proposals. Part II analyzes the volunteer im-
munity legislation both in terms of the broad tort reform debate
and from the vantage of the particular interests affected. Part III
focuses on the legislative strategy employed in the failed attempt
to immunize biomaterials producers, and evaluates their argu-
ment that the present tort system jeopardizes their industry's
viability. The Article concludes that the reform proposals would
significantly reduce legal protections for at-risk citizens whom
the proposals purport to assist: the poor, the aged, the young,
and the sick, who rely on the services and products offered by
these sectors.
104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 911, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995); S.
687, 103d Cong. (1993).
3 The Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong., was a broad tort
reform bill similar to prior proposals. Its provisions would have limited access to the
courts, capped damages, weakened joint and several liability, and mandated other
changes in state law to the detriment of injured plaintiffs. Section 108(b)(1), with some
exceptions, would have limited the amount of punitive damages to the greater of two
times the sum of the amount awarded to the claimant for economic loss and non-eco-
nomic loss, or $250,000. Section 110(a) states that the liability of each defendant for
non-economic loss shall be several but not joint. This bill did not pass during the spring
1997 term. The text of the bill has been debated and considered before and was referred
to as The Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995 (considered first as H.R.
956, 104th Cong. (1995)). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(a) et seq. (West
Supp. 1996)), was Part I of the legislation and became law on December 22, 1995. See
generally James Cahoy, Tort Reform Legislation Since 1994, W. LEGAL NEws, Dec. 6,
1996, at 13,055, available in 1996 WL 699299.
4Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 105 Pub. L. No. 19, 111 Stat. 218 (signed June
18, 1997).
5See Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1997, H.R. 872, 105th Cong. The
Biomaterials Access Assurance Act was also a rider implanted in S. 648, the Product
Liability Act of 1997, 105th Cong., Title II. See infra note 26. This bill has been
referred to various committees for review as H.R. 872 (referred to the House Comm.
on the Judiciary and Comm. on Commerce Feb. 27, 1997), S. 364 (referred to the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Feb. 26, 1997), S. 886,
Subtitle B (referred to the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources June 11,
1997), and S. 966 (referred to the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation June 26, 1997).
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I. TORT REFORM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AMERICAN
BUSINESS AGENDA
A. Generalizing the Class-Based Critique
The term "reform" suggests affirmative change that benefits
society, such as strengthened consumer protection laws and height-
ened civil liability to improve the quality of goods and services.
Consumer advocates, however, have long contended that tort
reformers have little intention of pursuing these goals. 6 They
argue that the tort reform agenda instead promotes the aims of
insurers and manufacturers. 7 Indeed, tort reformers have tried to
limit civil litigation options,' reduce exposure to civil liability,9
and enact legislation that allows industry to calculate its expo-
sure in advance and pass the cost on to the consumer in the
prices of goods and services.10 Proponents frame tort reform as
6 See Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women,
Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 673 (1996); see also David
Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal
for Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and
Punitive Damages, 80 IowA L. REv. 1109 (1995) (remarks of Advisory Panel Member
Larry S. Stewart, Esq., Stewart, Tilgham, Fox & Bianchi, P.A., Miami, Fla.: "The
reformers were not, however, interested in true reform to improve consumer rights.
Rather, the tort reform advocates have spent untold millions of dollars to promote ways
to eliminate or control jury decisions and thereby to reduce their individual and
collective responsibility."); Andrew F. Popper, A Federal Tort Law Is Still a Bad Idea:
A Comment on Senate Bill 687, 16 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 105 (1994).
7 See Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Report of the Governor's Commission on
Tort and Liability Insurance Reform, 53 TENN. L. REv. 679, 680 (1986) (criticizing
state tort reform proposals as "more of an evisceration than a reform of the system");
Philip Shuchman, It Isn't that the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It's Just that the Tort
Reformers Are So Wrong, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 485, 501 (1997) ("It is difficult to
estimate the value of any provision in the tort reform bills to favored industries. Surely,
in total they could be worth billions of dollars a year.").
8 See, e.g., H.B. 18, 1996 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1 (West) (repealing the judicially
created strict liability doctrine exposing property owners to liability without proof of
fault); H.B. 637, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 522 (expressly providing that there shall be no
strict liability in tort for product liability actions); H.E.A. 1741, 1995 Ind. Legis. Serv.
278 (West) (restricting strict liability actions to the manufacturer of the product).
9See, e.g., H.R. 956, 104th Cong., § 201(F)(1)(A) (1995) (versions 4 and 5)
(precluding the awarding of punitive damages against a manufacturer or product seller
of a drug that was subject to premarket approval by the FDA); OHIO RaV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.80(C) (Anderson 1995) (barring punitive damages against manufacturer of a
drug manufactured and labeled in compliance with FDA requirements); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 30.927 (1995) (barring punitive damages in a pharmaceutical case in which drug and
labeling was approved by the FDA); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (1989) (prohibiting
the award of punitive damages if the drug that caused the claimant's harm received
premarketing approval or licensure by the FDA).
10 See, e.g., Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956,
104th Cong. § 108(b) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of two times the sum
of economic and non-economic loss or $250,000); H.B. 2210, 180th Gen. Assem., 1996
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a matter of accountability; critics warn of its potential to margi-
nalize yet further the most vulnerable members of society."l
Against the charge that tort reform would weaken consumer
protection regimes, 12 insurance and industry interests counter that
"reforms" will liberate research, 3 facilitate new entrants into
markets of "excess liability,"'14 and restore sense to an "irra-
tional" litigation system.' 5 Such justifications are the polite stuff
Pa. Legis. Serv. 135 (West) (enacted Nov. 26, 1996) (limiting punitive damages in
medical malpractice suits to two times the compensatory damages); H.B. 20, P.A. 89-7,
89th Gen. Assem., 1995 II1. Legis Serv. 224 (West) (limiting punitive damages in cases
other than healing art or legal malpractice to three times economic damages, and
creating a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in all negligence and product
liability actions); see also Popper, supra note 6; Rustad, supra note 6. See generally
Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why
the Pro-Defendant Consensus On Warning Law Is Wrong, 61 TENN, L. REv. 1125
(1994); Shapo, supra note 1.
"See Helen R. Burstin et al., Do the Poor Sue More? A Case-Control Study of
Malpractice Claims and Socioeconomic Status, 270 JAMA 1697, 1701 (1993); see also
Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 443(1987) (stating that tort law "discriminates on the basis of class, race, and gender").
12See Rustad, supra note 6, at 758-59 ('"The Common Sense Legal Reform Act
blatantly attempts to reallocate power from consumers to corporations who market
products with excessive preventable dangers.").
13See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The threat of such enormous
awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new products.");
Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: Who Should
Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?, 47 ALA. L. REv. 825, 869
n.215 (1996) ("Research and development in American industry are being halted or
discouraged because of the threat of excessive punitive damage awards, thereby making
American business less competitive in the international market. Consequently, the
punitive damages problem is a direct threat to the economic stability of corporate
America.").
14See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987) (contending that there is a genuine crisis). To support
their conclusions, tort reformers often employ anecdotal evidence to prove the existence
of the "excess liability" crisis. For example, recent proponents of the crisis argument
consistently refer to Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.TS., Inc., No. CV-93-02419,
1995 WL 360309 (D. N.M. Aug. 18, 1994), the infamous coffee spill case, without
relying on hard data. Although sensationalized, the judge reduced the punitive damages
award from $2.7 million to $480,000; see also Milo Geyelin, Suits by Firms Exceed
Those by Individuals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1993, at BI (reporting on a study conducted
by the Rand institute for Civil Justice charting trends of 908 Fortune 1000 companies
from 1971 to 1991, showing that product liability suits have actually dropped from a
high of 3500 in 1985 to 1500 in 1991).
15See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of
Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 87 (1995) (debunking the "mythology of a
deranged judicial system"). The common allegation that the punitive damages regime
operates irrationally rests on thin empirical evidence. See, e.g., Saundra Torry, Juries
in the 1990's Reluctant to Make Punitive Damage Awards, WASH. POST, June 17, 1997,
at A3 (citing a Rand Institute study finding that "[plunitive damages are awarded in
less than four percent of civil lawsuits that reach juries and are given most frequently
in business cases in which the claimant has been harmed financially rather than
physically").
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of lobbying.1 6 The bills proposed and the laws passed provide
no protection for consumers, furnish no incentive for greater
safety, and significantly constrict the rights of the powerless,
arguments about promoting "market opportunity" notwithstand-
ing.17
The class-based nature of the tort-reform battle 8 is evident in
the breakdown of the groups supporting and opposing reform.
The insurance and manufacturing sectors have pushed for these
changes, 19 while groups acting on behalf of under-represented
populations have opposed such measures. For example, health
care and women's groups have protested changes that would
leave victims of defective birth control devices without mean-
ingful recourse. 20 Accident victims (and hastily formed victims'
organizations) have routinely opposed attempts to limit access
to the courts or cap damages.21 Broad-based consumer groups
1 Undoubtedly, politicians score points with members of the business community by
supporting tort reform bills. When vulnerable segments of the populace with limited
political power are the supposed beneficiaries of the legislation, the temptation to
support these measures is nearly irresistible.
17See Rustad, supra note 6; see generally supra notes 3, 6, 10 and accompanying
text.
IgNew laws that restrict the ability of injured consumers to secure redress in the
courts will most impact low- to moderate-income claimants. Underinsured or unin-
sured, these individuals are at risk. Accordingly, "courts traditionally have had to look
out for parties who lack the resources or the capacity to protect their own interests in
the face of a better-funded or more-informed adversary.' Jack B. Weinstein, Some
Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 241, 259 (1996) (footnote omitted). See generally Abel, supra note 11; Burton
D. Fretz & Ethel Zelenske, Judicial Conference Weighs Cutbacks in Federal-Court
Jurisdiction, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE Rnv. 1261, 1265 (1995) ("Perfect justice inside the
courtroom becomes meaningless if the courthouse doors are closed to the poor.");
Rodgers, supra note 1, at 525 ("Proponents of tort reform, primarily Citizens Against
Law Abuse (CALA), exploit the facts of numerous lawsuits in order to promote lawsuit
abuse hysteria to rally support for their position.') (footnotes omitted); Rustad, supra
note 6.19 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20 See Robert V. Costello, Poll Shows Majority Opposed to 'Contract With America,'
23 MAss. LAW. WKI.Y. 1380 (1995) (describing a poll commissioned and paid for by
Citizens Action, the NOW Legal Defense Fund, the Women's Health Coalition, the
National Breast Implant Coalition, DES Action, and the Association of Trial Lawyers
of America). Many of these bills would immunize manufacturers of federally approved
products from punitive damages, regardless of the knowledge of risk the producer or
seller may have acquired after regulatory approval.21 See generally Dana Coleman, Coalition of Consumers Is Newest Entry In Fray,
N.J. LAw., May 21, 1994, at 1 ("Consumers for Civil Justice ... was formed about
three weeks ago to mount a concerted fight against proposed tort reform legislation
.'); Stephen Schafer, Federal-Style Tort Reform Does Matter To You, 23 MASS. L.
Wiuvy. 1587 (1995) ("Representatives of consumer groups and victims' groups may
still be the better spokespersons in the debate over tort reform... "'). These groups
respond because of the overt negative effect that legislation like the Product Liability
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resist most tort reform plans, as they lack consumer protection
provisions, 22 yet shield manufacturers of dangerous and defective
products. 23 During the spring 1997 term of Congress, clashes
between consumer and victims' groups, on the one hand, and
business interests, on the other, occurred once again. 24
B. Immunity for Volunteers and Biomaterials: Exemplars of
the Class-Based Critique
The two narrowly focused bills of interest are the Volunteer
Protection Act25 and the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of
1997.26 The first eliminates conventional tort liability27 for vol-
unteers acting on behalf of charities. Supporters of this proposal
matched executives from tax-exempt organizations 2 with former
Reform Act of 1997 would have had on their members. That bill would have limited
punitive damage awards to situations of proven and flagrant indifference to the rights
or safety of others and would have capped the potential amount that plaintiffs could
recover. See supra note 3.22See generally Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory
of Tort Compensation, 75 TEx. L. Rav. 1567 (1997) (contending that the direct-
loss/compensation model that restricts tort recovery, particularly for pain and suffering,
lacks coherence and balance); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort
Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1995) (arguing that tort
reform legislative proposals, if adopted, would restrict the ability of women to secure
redress for product failure).
2 See Rustad, supra note 6, at 758; Gregory B. Westfall, The Nature of This Debate:
A Look at the Texas Foreign Corporation Venue Rule and a Method for Analyzing the
Premises and Promises of Tort Reform, 26 TEx. TEcH L. REv. 903, 925 (1995) ("The
tort reform debate really boils down to a simple policy question: Do we favor the
interests of business over the interests of those harmed thereby, or vice versa.").
24See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see generally Pace, supra note 13, at
826-27 (taking the position that punitive damages, a target of the tort reformers, serve
a vital function in deterring severe misconduct and should not be deductible as a
business expense); William Powers, Jr., Some Pitfalls of Federal Tort Reform Legisla-
tion, 38 Aiuz. L. REv. 909 (1996) (discussing the difficulties of implementing tort
reform through federal legislation); Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal
Role in American Tort Law, 38 A~iz. L. REv. 917, 919 (1996) (discussing the problem
of federalizing tort law: "It seems clear enough that in this recent tort reform debate,
federalism arguments were deployed (and withheld) strategically. If for substantive
reasons one favored the tort reforms Congress was considering, one simply ignored the
federalism issue. Yet if for substantive reasons one opposed those tort reforms, one
invoked the theme of states' rights.").
25Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (1997).
26This Act was integrated into the Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648,
105th Cong., Title II.
27 "Conventional" liability refers to misconduct short of intentional torts.
28See The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 911 and H.R. 1167
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Rep. Newt
Gingrich (R-Ga.); Sen. Paul Coverdell (R-Ga.); Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.); Sen.
John Ashcroft (R-Mo.); Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.); Rep. John Edward Porter (R-Ill.);
Mr. Conrad Teitell, on behalf of the Am. Council on Gift Annuities; Mr. Robert
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National Football League players29 to lobby for new law.30 At the
signing ceremony,3' President Clinton seemed implicitly to note
the eclectic nature of the lobby: "Americans recognize that we
are responsible for one another and that we are members of a
true community."3 2 Yet the celebrities and charity representatives
fronting the lobbying effort distract attention from the deleteri-
ous ramifications for "true community." Individuals who need
charitable or public services will have no recourse against neg-
ligent doctors, careless attorneys, and coaches who intimidate or
negligently harm children.33 A uniform expectation of due care
now belongs exclusively to those with the resources to pay for
such services.
The second tort reform proposal, the Biomaterials Access As-
surance Act, would dramatically lower due care liability stand-
ards for producers of the raw materials used to manufacture
certain medical devices and implants.34 Proponents argued that
such reform would encourage innovation and lower prices as new
players competed in the market. The Act did not pass. As a result,
several industry representatives informed the appropriate commit-
tee in the House that their companies might cease production.35
Goodwin, CEO of the Points of Lights Found.; Mr. John Graham, IV, CEO of the Am.
Diabetes Ass'n; Dr. Thomas Jones, managing director of the Washington office of
Habitat for Humanity; Mr. Fred Hanzalek, Prof'l Eng'r, Am. Soc'y of Mechanical
Engineers; Mr. Charles Tremper, senior vice president of Am. Ass'n of Homes and
Services for the Aging; and, in opposition, Prof. Andrew Popper, Washington College
of Law at American University) [hereinafter Volunteer Protection Act Hearings].
29 See id. (testimony of Mr. Lynn Swann, national spokesman for Big Brothers/Big
Sisters of Am.; Mr. Terry Orr, the Orr Co.).30 Curiously, not one witness could identify a single "unjustified" lawsuit brought
against his or her respective organization. See id. Instead, the needs of individual
volunteers became the focus. For example, Mr. Lynn Swann testified, "It is [the]
volunteers ... who.., should remain the focus." Id. This demonstrates the failure of
the legislation to consider the issue from the perspective of those who receive volunteer
services.
31 The ceremony took place on June 18, 1997. See Jeffrey P. Altman & Joanne M.
Kelly, V-Day for Volunteers: A New Law Shields Volunteers from Liability Concerns,
but It Doesn't Protect Their Organizations, LEGAL TIMES, July 28, 1997, at S. 39.32 President's Statement on Signing the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 33 WKLY.
Comp. PRES. Doc. 911 (June 19, 1997) (emphasis added); see also Volunteers Get
hnmunity From Some Lawsuits, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 22, 1997, at 14A.33 See Volunteer Protection Act § 4(a)(3) (stating that personal liability obtains only
if the volunteer's misconduct constitutes willful, gross, or reckless misconduct, or a
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the
volunteer).
34See S. 648, 105th Cong., Title II § 205 (1997) (articulating the specific liability
limitations of raw material producers).35 See The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1997: Hearings on Product Liability
Reform and Consumer Access To Life-Saving Products Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Com-
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II. THE VOLUNTEER PROTECTION ACT OF 1997:
PROTECTING PROVIDERS AT THE EXPENSE OF THOSE SERVED
The Volunteer Protection Act immunizes those who voluntar-
ily provide services under the auspices of any tax-exempt organi-
zation.36 Without the risk of tort liability, so its premise goes,
more people will volunteer, and the quality and volume of chari-
table work will increase. Backers of the proposal did not offer
even a single study to support the claim that tort immunity
would raise the number or quality of volunteers. More disturb-
ing, this law erodes the right to expect others to exercise due
care.3 7 Further, while this law most affects recipients of charita-
ble services, no representatives of these recipients testified in the
hearings that culminated in the bill's adoption. 38
A. Immunizing Volunteers: Standard Tort Reform
Like most tort reform proposals, the Volunteer Protection Act
came packaged as a response to the "potential for [excess] li-
merce, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Biomaterials Access Assurance Act Hearings].
During his testimony, Jorge E. Ramirez, Ph.D. (Hoechst Group) suggested that the
"continued availability of biomaterials and the continued participation of companies,
such as Hoechst" depended on the adoption of the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act.
Ronald W. Dollens (Guidant Corp.) delivered a similar message when he asserted that
this legislation was necessary to "help ensure the continued availability of the bioma-
terials they need to make the products American patents require." Id. at 59.36 See Volunteer Protection Act § 4(a). The protection does not extend to groups that
fall within the federal definition of "racist" or that engage in "hate crimes." See id. at
§ 4(f)(1)(B).
37From this point forward, conformity with due care, that "standard of conduct
imposed by the law ... based upon what society demands generally of its members"
is more than can be expected of volunteers. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 169 & nn.6-8 (5th ed. 1984); see also H.R.
911, 105th Cong., § 4(a)(2) (1997) ("[A]ny volunteer of a nonprofit organization or
governmental entity shall incur no personal financial liability for any tort claim alleging
damage or injury from any act or omission of the volunteer on behalf of the
organization entity.., if such damage or injury was not caused by willful and wanton
misconduct.").
38 See Volunteer Protection Act Hearings, supra note 28. No tenants' organization,
representative of those receiving public assistance, or other individual acting on behalf
of those served by charities testified before any committee that studied this bill prior
to recommending it to the Congress. In fact, only one or two opposition witnesses
testified during the hearings discussing the bill. See H.R. REP. No. 105-101, pt. 1 (1997)
(including the sole statement of congressional opposition signed by Rep. John Conyers,
Jr. (D-Mich.), Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.), Rep. Robert C. Scott (D-Va.), and Rep.
Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.)); see also 143 CONG. REc. S3861 (1997); 143 CONG. REc. S4915
(1997). These reports on the Volunteer Protection Act discuss the legislation; yet, they
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ability ... and unwarranted litigation costs."39 In the past, when
the insurance and manufacturing sectors have claimed crises
from excess exposure, independent research has proved such
claims to be baseless.4 0 Often, the research arms of Congress
performed these studies.41 This time, no study or statistical analysis
was even proffered to support the claim that the volunteers im-
munized under the new law needed protection against rampant,
unwarranted liability.42
B. Core Components of the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997
The preemption language of the Volunteer Protection Act dif-
fers significantly from that of the more comprehensive reform
contain no oppositional testimony by any group acting on behalf of persons foreseeably
served by volunteers covered under the act.
39 Volunteer Protection Act §§ 2(a)(1), (a)(5) ("The willingness of volunteers to offer
their services is deterred by the potential for liability . . . . [and] . . . high liability
costs and unwarranted litigation costs... "').40See supra notes 6, 9, 11, and accompanying text. As to volunteer liability, "[n]o
statistics were given during the debate over the bill on how widespread lawsuits against
volunteers are, or how great a factor the fear of lawsuits is in discouraging charitable
work. But proponents offered anecdotes.' Marianne Lavelle, Volunteers Now Have Tort
Shield, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1997, at A10. See 143 CONG. REC. S3744-47 (1997)
(statement of Sen. Coverdell (R-Ga.) in support of the Volunteer Protection Act); 143
CONG. REc. H3096-97 (1997) (statement of Rep. Bob Inglis (R-S.C.) in support of the
Volunteer Protection Act); see also Volunteer Liability: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, FDCH CONG. TEST. (Apr. 23, 1997) (testimony of Rep. John
Edward Porter) (citing a 1988 Gallup survey that concluded there is a great deal of
concern for the risk of liability, though only "one in twenty organizations reported
being sued on a directors and officers liability question" in the past five years).4 1 See OFFICE TECH. ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE, OTA-H-602 (1994); OFFICE TECH. ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS, OTA-BP-H-119 (1993); Rustad, supra note 6, at
702-03 ("All the empirical studies point to one conclusion: punitive damages are not
out of control. Tort reformers continually inform journalists that the numbers are in
dispute ... [but] [t]he key finding of every empirical study of punitive damages is that
the number and size of awards do not indicate a nationwide litigation crisis:');
Shuchman, supra note 7; see also Andrew M. Moskowitz, Meaning is in the Eye of
the Beholder: BMW v. Gore and Its Potential Impact on Toxic Tort Actions Brought
under State Common Law, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 221, 229-30 (1996) ("[O]ne recent
study that examined verdicts in forty-five of the... most populous counties... found
that plaintiffs received punitive damage awards in only six percent of cases.').42 Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.), a member of the House committee responsible
for reviewing the legislation, expressed doubt about the "reality" of a liability crisis
with volunteers: "It looks like we are dealing more with myth than fact.' See Ken
Foskett, GOP Pushes Law to Exempt Volunteers From Liability, ATLANTA CONST., Apr.
24, 1997, at A10; see generally Volunteer Protection Hearings, supra note 28. The
concerns of Rep. Conyers were set forth in the sole dissenting report accompanying
the Volunteer Protection Act legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 105-101, pt. 1 (1997)
(accompanying H.R. 911, 105th Cong. (1997)).
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bills of the past.43 Instead of overt preemption of state law, this
legislation "preempts the laws of any State ... except that this
Act shall not preempt any State law that provides additional
protection from liability relating to volunteers. '44 In addition, the
statute permits a state to opt out.45 The drafters thus neutralized
states' rights opposition to tort reform. While it is hard to con-
ceive that a state legislature would make the political blunder of
re-imposing tort liability on volunteers, the presence of opting-
out language presumably made it possible for states' rights leg-
islators to back the new law.
The heart of the legislation involves a bar to liability for
individual volunteers. The law provides, "no volunteer of a non-
profit organization or governmental entity shall be liable for
harm caused by an act or omission of the volunteer on behalf of
the organization. '46 Immunity is not absolute; in the event that
the harm is caused by "willful or criminal misconduct, gross
negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indif-
ference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the
volunteer," the plaintiff may pursue a claim. 47 Further, immunity
does not apply to injuries caused by the volunteer in the course
of "operating a motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other vehicle
for which the State requires . . . [a] license. '48
The new law does preserve the right of one injured by the
negligence of a volunteer to pursue a claim against the organi-
zation that sponsors or supervises the volunteer.49 Undoubtedly,
retaining institutional liability enhanced the appeal of this legis-
lation. Organizational liability minimizes the risk posed by the
unaccountable volunteer. Such a notion, however, implies that a
volunteer worker will proceed with the same level of caution and
care as if personally responsible simply because a sponsoring
organization ultimately could be civilly liable for misconduct.
Again, no testimony or information was submitted to support an
43 Preemption in prior tort reform bills is explicit. See, e.g., H.R. 1167, 105th Cong.§ 3 (1997) ("This Act preempts the laws of any State ... ."); S. 648, 105th Cong.§ 102(a) (1997) ("This Act governs any product liability action brought in any State
or Federal court on any theory for harm caused by a product.").
"Volunteer Protection Act § 3(a).45 See id. at §§ 3(a), 3(b)(2) (permitting a state to "enact[ ] a statute ... declaring
the election of such State that this Act shall not apply").46 Id. at § 4(a).
471d. at § 4(a)(3).481d. at § 4(a)(4)(A).
49 See id. at § 4(c) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the liability
of any nonprofit organization or governmental entity....").
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assumption that volunteers will exercise the same level of care
regardless of personal accountability.5 0
The Act also retains liability for the volunteer if his or her
action constitutes a federal crime, a hate crime, a sexual offense,
a violation of a civil rights law, or a harm caused while the
volunteer was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.51 Despite
this retention of liability, the Act restricts the amount of dam-
ages a plaintiff may receive. The law prohibits punitive damages
"unless the claimant establishes by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the harm" was caused by action "which constitutes
willful or criminal misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indiffer-
ence to the rights or safety of the individual harmed.' '52 The law
also limits the amount of damages by putting a restriction on
non-economic loss, which effectively abolishes joint and several
liability for pain and suffering.53
C. Potential Consequences of the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997
Assuming for a moment that tort immunity for volunteers will
increase the population of those willing to serve,54 it is important
50 See Daniel L. Kurtz, Protecting Your Volunteer: The Efficacy of Volunteer Protec-
tion Statutes and Other Liability Limiting Devices in Not-For-Profit Organizations: The
Challenge of Governance in an Era of Retrenchment, 726 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 263 (1992)
(reporting of insurance coverage for volunteers). Any analogy to granting immunity to
prosecutors is inapposite. Personal immunity is a risky proposition, provided only when
massive public policy goals are at stake, for example, providing immunity for prose-
cutors to ensure vigorous enforcement of the law without fear of personal liability.
Unlike volunteers, however, a prosecutor can be disciplined, dismissed, or disbarred.
Sanctions sufficient to relieve concerns about the lack of personal accountability are
unavailable for activity involving the vast majority of volunteers.
51 See Volunteer Protection Act § 4(f)(1).52 1d. at § 4(e). This provision is virtually identical to provisions found in earlier tort
reform bills, see supra note 2, which propose the use of the "conscious flagrant
disregard" standard (the functional equivalent of criminal intent) as a threshold for
punitive damages, and a quantum of evidence standard of "clear and convincing
evidence," which places a significantly higher burden on plaintiffs than does the
"preponderance" test used in various states. State tort reform limits punitive damages
in various ways. See, e.g., H.B. 20, 1st Ex. Sess., 1996 La. Sess. Law Serv. 2 (West)
(repealing the statute that authorized punitive damages to be awarded for wrongful
handling of hazardous substances); H.E.A. 1741, 109th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.,
1995 Ind. Legis. Serv. 278-1995 (West) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of
three times compensatory damages or $50,000); H.B. 20, P.A. 89-7, 89th Gen. Assem.,
1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 224 (West) (limiting punitive damages in certain cases to three
times economic damages).53 See S. 543, 105th Cong. § 5(b)(1) (1997) (limiting recovery for non-economic loss
and determining damages "in direct proportion to the percentage of responsibility of
that defendant"). Thus, there is no joint and several liability for non-economic
damages.54 Whether the legislation would accomplish its purported goal may not have been
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to consider the individuals most affected by this law: those
served by volunteers. They are victims of disasters, students
assisted in public and private schools, children receiving day
care or engaged in organized athletics, patients in hospice care,
clients requiring counsel through charitably funded legal serv-
ices programs, and countless others in need of the help, compas-
sion, and diverse skills that volunteers can provide.5 This is a
highly vulnerable group, legally unsophisticated, often powerless
to select the person who will assist them, and sometimes unable
to discern inappropriate behavior. Unfortunately, the process by
which the law was enacted took no account of the risks associ-
ated with volunteer service when the recipient is powerless.5 6 It
is worth asking why in this situation, involving those least able
to bargain in the marketplace for assistance, Congress would
eliminate the incentives of volunteers to act with due care. Not
even the most extreme of the broader tort reform proposals at-
tempted this. The debate over most of those bills concerned the
virtues of strict liability or damages.
An underlying principle of tort law is that the threat of per-
sonal liability creates individual accountability and thereby en-
hances the quality of goods and services.5 7 Accordingly, the com-
an overriding concern in passing this law. Rather, it seems likely that the bill's
supporters may have been motivated by the positive publicity generated by the idea.
The congressional process, including hearings and a variety of press conferences, for
the Volunteer Protection Act took place during the week of the "Presidential Summit."
President Clinton, past presidents, war heroes, and other dignitaries were invited to
Philadelphia to share ideas on the topic of how to increase volunteerism. If media
coverage is any indication of public reaction, public sentiment for volunteerism seemed
to have been at an all-time high: "The media gushed all over it. Volunteerism got two
thumbs up on the covers of all the major news weeklies." The Volunteer State,
PROGRESSIVE, June 1997, at 8; see also BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, Apr. 28, 1997
("Most papers led with the volunteer summit."). In this setting, a vote against this
legislation would have been perceived as a vote against hard-working volunteers, rather
than a vote in favor of assuring that those who receive volunteer services have a right
to expect delivery of those services in a reasonable manner.
55 The hearings focused on volunteer virtuosity, not the needs of service recipients.56 In the hearings for this law, there was passing reference to a child abuse case
involving a scout leader. Otherwise, there was no mention of the types of injuries
inflicted on recipients. (Although there is no published transcript of this hearing as of
the time of printing, the author was present at the hearing.)57See Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEo. L.J. 649, 688 (1990)
(reviewing PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES (1988)) ("The business community provides some support for the argument
that tort law has deterrent effects that encourage safe products . . . . Managers say
products have become safer, managing procedures have been improved, and labels and
use instructions have become more explicit'); see also Bogus, supra note 15, at 4
("Even some scholars who view the product liability system with less than unqualified
enthusiasm acknowledge it to be the principal mechanism protecting the public from
dangerous products."). Bogus refers to George L. Priest's comment that, rather than
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mon law imposes a minimum level of due care on people who
choose to volunteer.5 The Volunteer Protection Act changes that
standard, 9 and in so doing, reduces the incentive to provide
quality services. The potential liability of the sponsoring organi-
zation is simply an inadequate substitute for personal account-
ability. Thus, while increasing the number of volunteers is a
legitimate government objective,60 eliminating standards of due
care to accomplish this end may adversely affect the quality of
services provided.
In addition to threatening the quality of volunteer services, the
Volunteer Protection Act immunizes too many people from per-
sonal liability. The law applies to anyone acting under the aus-
pices of a 501(c)(3) entity, with the exception of those that fall
within the Hate Crimes Statistics Act.61 Due to this broad defini-
tion, the number of persons liberated from personal account-
ability is estimated to be 90 million.62 While it might make sense
to immunize trained Red Cross volunteers from liability, this law
would have the same effect on numerous medical centers (where
volunteers occasionally administer care and keep records), legal
aid offices, day care providers, college sororities and fraternities,
and countless social organizations.
Another option available to Congress, considered at the same
time as the Volunteer Protection Act, was similarly flawed. That
plan, H.R. 911, was a fiscal incentive measure designed to en-
regulatory agencies, "our society relies on liability actions to police the manufacturing
process:' See Bogus, supra note 15, at 5 n.13 (citing George L. Priest, Product Liability
Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABLILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184, 190-91
(Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988)).
58See Schulker v. Roberson, 676 So.2d 684 (La. App. 1996); Marsallis v. LaSalle,
94 So.2d 120, 124 (La. App. 1957) (involving the power to impose liability on one
who volunteers to undertake a duty, in this instance, the oddly difficult task of watching
a potentially rabid cat for two weeks).
59 H.R. 1167, 105th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (1997) ("Except as provided in subsections (b)
and (d), no volunteer of a nonprofit organization or governmental entity shall be liable
for harm caused by an act or omission of the volunteer on behalf of the organization
or entity if ... the harm was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct ... or a
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the
volunteer.').
60 While this is a legitimate objective, it is curious to note that no documentation of
a "crisis" in volunteerism was offered during the political process leading to the
enactment of this legislation. Perhaps no such documentation exists. "During the past
five years alone, the average amount of time given by volunteer workers has more than
doubled." Edward J. Rice, Jr., Presidents Page: Community Service: It's Good for the
Public, the Profession, Your Firm and You, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 489 (1995).
61 S. 543, 105th Cong. §§ 5(4), 6(4)(A) (1997).
62 See National Service or Government Service?, J. Am. CIT. PoL'Y REv., Sept.-Oct.
1996, at 33.
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courage the states to do what many of them (for better or worse)
already did: modify internal state tort law.63 Like the opt-out
provision of the Volunteer Protection Act, such legislation would
have provided an opportunity for states to consider the complex
ramifications of granting immunity to volunteers. The bill re-
sponded to a perceived reduction in the number of volunteers by
offering hard cash to any state willing to remove due care obli-
gations from potential volunteers.64 Although the bill failed, it is
worth noting that, in this era of balanced budgets, no one offered
an estimate of the program's cost.65 Rather than immunize po-
tentially negligent volunteers, there might have been greater value
in providing the Red Cross and similar organizations a direct
annual grant of millions of dollars. 66
One can only speculate about the future impact of the Volun-
teer Protection Act.67 The law could increase costs to organiza-
tions in at least two ways. First, liability for the negligence of
the volunteers may impose direct costs on the organizations.
Second, fear of this liability68 may lead to indirect costs. For
example, the increased prospect of organizational liability in lieu
63 See, e.g., Mark Thompson, Letting The Air Out Of Tort Reform, 83 A.B.A. J. 64,
65 (1997) ("Legislatures in 31 states had capped punitive damages or made them harder
to win, and five states ... have prohibited them outright in tort actions.").
64The incentive to the states would have been a one percent additur for social service
funding. See H.R. 911, 105th Cong. § 5(a) (1997).
65 The Act does not explain what is included in "social services:' Assuming, however,
that it refers, inter alia, to food stamps, a program that cost $24.4 billion in 1995, a
one percent "benefit" for relieving volunteers of the duty to use due care could have
cost up to $240 million. See Todd G. Cozenza, Note, Preserving Procedural Due
Process for Legal Immigrants Receiving Food Stamps in Light of the Personal Respon-
sibility Act of 1996, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2065, 2079 (1997).
66But see Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal
Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1269, 1298 n.80
(1993) (citing INST. OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF NONPROFIT Ass'Ns, NONPROFITS' RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE, STATE LIABILITY LAWS FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZA-
TIONS AND VOLUNTEERS 1 (1990)).
67 There is no question about the immediate legal effect: volunteers are no longer
personally responsible for harms caused through negligence, short of gross, wanton, or
willful misconduct. Given this effect, one has to wonder if the services delivered today
are sufficiently safe to immunize 90 million people who come into contact with those
in need of assistance. "Service has a long and venerable history in the U.S., and it
remains strong today .... About 90 million adults volunteer... National Service
or Government Service?, J. AM. CIT. POL'Y REV., supra note 62, at 33.
68A fear of liability has motivated the actions of charitable organizations under the
previous tort regime. Consider that, even before this legislation passed, there were
"attempts by nonprofit organizations to shield themselves from suit by claiming to be
a government agency:' Francis Leazes, Pay Now or Pay Later: Training and Torts in
the Public Sector, 24 PUB. PERS. MGMT. 167 (1995). This effort has failed because of
the increasingly limited application of sovereign immunity. Id.
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of individual accountability 69 might compel charitable organiza-
tions to train, control, and manage volunteers more carefully.70
The burden imposed by these increased costs may force organi-
zations to limit the number of volunteers,71 and select only those
who appear to pose the least risk.72
It is likely that the Volunteer Protection Act will adversely
affect low- to moderate-income individuals, who are the primary
recipients of volunteer services.73 The message sent is clear: the
underclass is not entitled to the same due care as those with
resources. 74 Legislation of this type forgives malpractice by doc-
tors75 and lawyers when the victim receives charitable medical
or legal services. It excuses harmful behavior (short of gross,
wanton, or willful acts) toward children, so long as they are poor.
69 In the world of public sector and non-profit organizations, concern about miscon-
duct and harm by volunteers existed before this legislation passed. Commentators in
the field often urge increased training to "minimize negligent, harmful actions?' Id.
70"(F)ailing to train staff has emerged as an increasing area of legal concern for
public and private organizations." Id. With the advent of the personally unaccountable
volunteer, this concern may be heightened due to the retention of organizational
liability, resulting in increased costs to charities.
71 While there is no data available as yet to support this, it is only logical to assume
that if charitable organizations become exclusively responsible for the tortious conduct
of immunized volunteers, they will have to exercise greater care in selecting those who
work on their behalf. The decrease in the number of volunteers as a result of screening
would defeat the purported purpose of the act. Furthermore, no data was presented to
support the proponents' view that the removal of the potential of liability would
increase the number of volunteers.
72The costs imposed on these organizations may not seem quite so threatening when
one considers the impressive financial support for the 90 million newly immunized
volunteers. An Associated Press release published in 1996 indicates that "Americans
donated 23.5 billion dollars to charities last year, which is a 5% increase in charitable
giving.' Amelia David, The Benefits of Giving: Sharing the Gift of Yourself This
Holiday, BACK STAGE, Dec. 6, 1996, at 20. "Health charities number in the thousands,
[and] receive billions of dollars annually in contributions." James T. Bennet & Thomas
J. DiLorenzo, What's Happening to Your Health Charity Donations, CONSUMER RES.,
Dec. 1996, at 10.
73Although there are others who fall victim to natural disaster or catastrophe, they
number far fewer than those who, due to economic circumstances, must rely on others.
74See Fretz & Zelenske, supra note 18, at 1265.
75Even before this legislation, doctors were often unaccountable for their treatment
of the poor. See Burstin, supra note 11, at 1700 (discussing a recent study illustrating
that not only do indigent victims lack adequate medical care and malpractice claim
representation, but are also less likely to sue when injured).
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1I. THE BIOMATERIALS ACCESS ASSURANCE ACT OF 1997:
THE STRATEGY OF CAPITALIZING ON FEAR
76
As narrow in scope as the Volunteer Protection Act is, it
nonetheless applies to multiple disciplines and interests, and is
therefore broader in scope than other tort reform proposals that
target specific industries. Over the past fifteen years, groups such
as airline manufacturers and pharmaceutical producers have asked
Congress for immunity or other forms of special treatment, claim-
ing that their industries cannot survive if state tort law applies
to the products they produce or the services they provide. 7 These
requests often come accompanied with an even graver message:
protection is needed to avert health and safety disasters. During
the 1997 term, as well, tort reformers asserted that a failure to
give immunity to biomaterials producers, which would force
major manufacturers and researchers into bankruptcy, would leave
biomaterials production to the unsuited, the foreign,7 and the
back alley.79
76Although most health and safety legislation is, in part, generated by fear of a
discernible harm, the biomaterials debate was unusual in that it involved private citizens
showcasing their illnesses and disbilities before Congress. See infra note 83 (involving
the use of a three-year-old child in a formal congressional hearing by Rep. George
Gekas (R-Pa.)).
77See Statements of Introduced Bills and Joint Resohltions, Remarks of Senator
McConnell in Support of S. 1979, the 'Lawsuit Reform Act,' 137 CONG. REc. S 16852-53
(Nov. 15, 1991) (contending that pharmaceutical companies have "stopped making
vaccines" and exited the contraceptive market, and that the "general aviation industry"
is "decimated": problems that federal tort reform would allegedly solve); Hearings on
the Civil Justice Fairness Act, S. 672, 104th Cong. (1995) (opening statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)) (reciting the plea of the pharmaceutical manufacturers for
immunity from punitive damages, noting how "reform" has benefited the aviation
industry); see also Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial:
Punitive Damages vs. New Products, 246 ScI. 1395, 1397 (1989) (correlating strict
liability, huge jury awards, and punitive damages with declining production or devel-
opment of contraceptives, vaccines, suit-case-size kidney dialysis units, and anesthesia
machines).
78 See Biomaterials Access Assurance Act Hearings, supra note 35 (prepared testi-
mony of Mark A. Behrens, Esq.) ("Federal biomaterials legislation would help stop the
needless exportation of jobs to foreign countries by allowing market needs to be met
by sound U.S. companies.").79See, e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying text. The opening remarks in the
Biomaterials hearing by Rep. George Gekas, a vocal supporter of immunity for
biomaterials producers, were devoted to the fear that essential life-saving devices would
be taken from those in need if the grant of immunity were not given to the raw materials
suppliers. To underscore his point, he read a letter from a mother who feared the loss
of such products: "'[w]ithout a shunt Nathan would suffer brain damage and die ....
[It] would be a matter of hours or days and would be extremely painful.' A crisis exists
and there are 7.5 million Americans who are depending on us to do something about
it!' Biomaterials Access Assurance Act Hearings, supra note 35.
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A. Pursuing Legislative Advantage by Threatening Market
Abandonment
The biomaterials legislative proposal came before the Sub-
committee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Pro-
tection of the House Committee on Commerce in April 1997.80
Virtually all who testified in favor of the bill suggested that,
absent immunity, many life-saving resources and devices would
become unavailable.8 Producers insisted that tort immunity was
simply indispensable.82 Such fear-mongering has become stand-
ard in the tort reform debate.
This time, however, families terrified by the prospect of losing
essential life-saving products echoed industry admonitions in
their own testimony before Congress.83 Undoubtedly, the fami-
lies believed such legislation necessary.84 Those who orches-
trated their testimony, however, exploited their raw emotions.
Lobbyists have the responsibility to inform-not to scare-Con-
gress and the American public, even if this means waiving an
easy means to bolster popularity for tort reform.8 5 As with lob-
80 See Biomaterials Access Assurance Act Hearings, supra note 35.
81 See supia notes 35 and 79. On February 10, 1997, ten members of Congress sent
a "Dear Colleagues" letter seeking to secure co-sponsors for the Biomaterials Assur-
ance Act of 1997. The letter warned that a "looming crisis exists" in which providers
of raw materials will "limit, or cease altogether, shipments of raw materials." Activity
of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs During the 103rd Congress, S.R. 104-27 (1995).
See also Victor Schwartz & Mark Behrens, Liability 'Overkill' Threatens Lives and
Wallets, LAS VEGAS Rv.-J., Mar. 30, 1997, at 1E ("Unfortunately for Tara, life saving
medical devices like the shunt may not be available when they are needed because
manufacturers can no longer obtain supplies of basic raw materials. This is due to
product liability overkill.").
82 See Biomaterials Access Assurance Act Hearings, supra note 35 (testimony of
Ronald Dollens, Bd. of Dir., Health Indus. Mfr. Ass'n) ("The destructive impact of
current liability laws on the medical device industry and the patients it serves is
especially profound .... As Senator Joe Lieberman has accurately stated, 'biomateri-
als access is a public health time bomb."').83 See id. Ms. Belinda Simonini testified eloquently before the subcommittee, ex-
pressing her fear for the well-being of her beautiful three-year-old son, Titus, who
benefits from a shunt made from a biomaterial and who was present in the hearing
room. See id. His presence was not lost on Rep. George Gekas. At the outset of the
hearing, Titus was brought center stage. Rep. Gekas, who chaired the hearing, intro-
duced Titus. The transcript of the hearing did not fully capture the emotional impact
Titus had on those assembled. It reads, in part, as follows: "Mr. Gekas .... Titus, can
you come up here for a minute? Put him on top of this chair here. Stand him on top.
This is Titus. He has presented to me ... a documented gift ... [a note saying, inter
alia] please support the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act, love Titus?' Id. at 21.
" The author wishes to express that this commentary is not in any way directed at
these families, who showed great courage and compassion, but rather at those who
would capitalize on their suffering.
85 In calling the April 10, 1997 hearings to order, Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman of the
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bying efforts for volunteer immunity, the responsibility to inform
was taken lightly: no credible evidence corroborated claims of a
biomaterials availability crisis.86
B. If There Is a Problem with Biomaterials, It Has Little to
Do with Tort Liability
Admittedly, precedent exists for the type of relief sought by
the biomaterials industry. For example, in a few cases involving
vaccines, in which researchers could document the likelihood of
severe crisis in the industry, narrow, carefully conceived legisla-
tion has been used.87 The biomaterials industry, however, shows
no signs of crisis. Rather, this is an industry that has prospered, 88
has sustained no substantive negative judicial decisions, has doz-
ens of stable companies and many new market entrants, 89 and
has enjoyed relative regulatory inaction by the FDA.
Tort liability remains essential because the FDA alone cannot
ensure public health and safety. Three years ago, an oversight
committee analyzing the FDA's effectiveness in regulating bioma-
terials and their downstream products gave the FDA low marks.
It found, inter alia, that the FDA had allowed a product on the
market "that actually killed patients ... [and] may have been
House Comm. on the Judiciary, stated "[a]s poll after poll shows, the American public
wants reform of our current, out-of-control legal system and they deserve it." Bioma-
terials Access Assurance Act Hearings, supra note 35.86 In fact, there was no testimony of a single case in which a supplier of biomaterials
was held liable in tort. The absence of a demonstrable crisis has not prevented tort
reformers from using the crisis theme. See generally STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE
MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 4, 163-94 (1995) (stating that
product liability cases accounted for only 4.2% of all of the jury verdicts in the 82
sites studied and that "a limited number of business entities were named as defendants
in a substantial number of cases"). Moreover, it is difficult for reform advocates to base
their generalized claims of a litigation explosion on increased federal filings when over
one-half of the growth of filings from 1974 to 1985 involved only three products:
asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and Benedectin. See id.
87See The Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa et seq. (1988).
s8The Wall Street Journal and the Journal of Medical Economics both praised the
economic and investment virtues of biomaterials and related companies in the months
preceding the hearings on the legislation. See Elyse Tanouye, Three Drug Companies
Post Hefty Earnings Increases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1997, at B4; Doreen Mangan,
Why Medical Device Stocks Belong in Your Portfolio, J. MED. ECON., Jan. 13, 1997, at
55.89For example, Baxter Int'l, Pfizer, Inc., Medtronic, DuPont, Dow, Sigma Aldrich,
3M, Abbott Labs, Hoechst Celanese, Cordis, Inc., Bio-Pace Tech., Cardiac Control
Systems, Inc., Ela Med., Intermedics, Inc., Novocain, Siemens Pacesetter, Alcon, Inc.,
DGR, Inc., Hymedix Int'l, Inc., and others, are all relatively new to the industry.
1998] One-Term Tort Reform Tale 141
ineffective in treating life-threatening diseases.'" 90 Other FDA-
approved products later turned out to be similarly flawed, such
as the Bjork-Shiley heart valve, certain types of implant materi-
als, and the Copper-7 IUD.9 1 The tort system, then, is a neces-
sary complement to the FDA.92
The campaign for tort immunity in this area is particularly
troubling given the barriers to civil liability that already exist.93
Outside of clear and overt negligence, liability of a component-
part producer is rare.94 In 1986, a Massachusetts appellate court
surveyed a number of states and rejected an implied duty to
warn, finding, "the prevailing view is that a supplier of a com-
ponent part... has no duty to warn... of any danger that may
arise after the components are assembled."95 Federal courts also
follow the restrictive liability rules regarding component-part
providers. 96 Even New Jersey, the state that birthed absolute
90 SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 103RD CONG., LESS THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS: REFORMS NEEDED
IN THE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND RESOURCES OF THE FDA's CENTER FOR
DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, (1993).
91 See, e.g., Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989);
Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), appeal
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 479 U.S. 1049 (1987), and overruled by Stangvik v.
Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991) (involving a wrongful death action against
corporation for alleged defective heart valve); Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust,
908 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (involving products liability action against
manufacturer, asserting claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranties,
fraud, and infliction of emotional distress in reference to the Dalkon Shield IUD).92
,"Medical devices have not been subject to the same rigorous pre-market clearance
procedures that govern the marketing of prescription drugs:' Teresa Moran Schwartz,
Prescription Productions and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV.
1357, 1391 (1994) (footnote omitted).93 See generally Robert L. Haig & Stephen P. Caley, Successfully Defending Products
Liability Cases, 4 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Toxic Torts No. 15, at 23 (1985) (explaining
that there are many ways to defend a raw materials provider, although all the defenses
originate with the "bulk suppliers" defense); Gregory L. Harper, Comment, An Analysis
of the Potential Liabilities and Defenses of Bulk Suppliers of Titanium Biomaterials,
32 GONZ. L. REv. 195 (1996) (discussing litigation options, strategies, and defenses
in cases brought against raw materials suppliers).94 See Kealoha v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 844 . Supp. 590, 594 (D. Haw.
1994) ("A manufacturer of a nondefective component part has no duty to analyze the
design and assembly of the completed product of an unrelated manufacturer to
determine if the component is made dangerous by the integration into the finished
product?'). There is no case regarding biomaterials in which the raw products producer
was found liable or in which the component part provider defenses failed, outside of
those situations where the bio-product itself was defective. The defenses include the
conventional bulk supplier defense, the learned intermediary or sophisticated user
defense, and the doctrine of intervening cause. See Harper, supra note 93, at 222.
95Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 487 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1986).96See, e.g., Sperry v. Bauermeister, 4 F.3d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
manufacturer of component part was not liable for failure to warn of danger that
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 35
liability,97 rejects component-part liability outside of negligence.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently found that, outside of
negligence, "no public policy can be served by imposing tort
liability on a manufacturer of specialized parts . . . when . . .
the parts were created in accordance with ... specifications of
the owner and assembler of the unit."98 Although the biomateri-
als industry already benefits from significant rules that reduce
its exposure to liability, it seeks to operate outside of the tort
system entirely.99
In the U.S. marketplace, the uniform use of contractual indem-
nification protects manufacturers of component parts, whether
biomaterials or wooden wheel spokes. Indemnification is incom-
plete only in those situations in which the assembler of the
component parts is bankrupt or otherwise unavailable for suit.
Embracing a regime of immunity and unaccountability for bioma-
terials providers is thus unwarranted.
Part of the biomaterials industry's plea is that tort litigation
costs (as distinguished from the payment of judgments) will
overwhelm them. 00 This argument suffers from at least two flaws.
First, if fear of litigation costs justify immunity, then it is hard
resulted from design defect of product that used the component part). See also Hager,
supra note 10, at 1149, 1159, 1161.
97See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (N.J. 1982)
(holding that a duty to warn of an unknowable risk exists); see also Feldman v. Lederle
Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984) (limiting absolute liability to asbestos cases).98Zaza v. Marquess, 675 A.2d 620, 633 (N.J. 1996).
"The purpose of the biomaterials legislation has been clear for some time, This
legislation is designed to "allow raw materials suppliers to be dismissed from lawsuits
against medical device manufacturers, without incurring extensive legal costs, where
the raw materials used in a medical device met contract specifications and the supplier
... [is not] a manufacturer or a seller... "' S. REP. No. 104-83, at 3 (1995). In other
words, raw materials suppliers would have no generic due care obligations and no
possible liability in a strict liability case.
l°°DuPont, the materials suppliers for the Vitek jaw implant, is a leading proponent
of the argument that "excessive costs" destroy raw materials producers. DuPont's
General Counsel Ross Schmucki contends, "the cost of . . . these cases teaches raw
materials suppliers ... that excessive and unrecoverable costs are associated with the
sale of raw materials." Gary Taylor, A Discovery by DuPont: Hidden Costs of Winning,
NAT'L. L.J., Mar. 27, 1995, at BI. Several factors limit sympathy, however. First,
DuPont has won every case brought against it in its capacity as raw materials supplier.
Second, when Vitek, the assembler of the TMJ implant, went bankrupt, thousands of
victims of the fragmenting jaw implant were left without recourse. A court could have
permitted recovery against downstream suppliers, just as courts permit redress against
an otherwise protected or indemnified retailer when a manufacturer of a defectively
designed product goes bankrupt. The courts, however, spared DuPont that responsibil-
ity. Finally, DuPont has successfully sought recovery of costs against injured plaintiffs.
In one case, the company recovered $26,000. See id.; see also Ross F. Schmucki, How
To Manage Mass Tort Litigation Inside the Law Department, CORP. LEGAL TIMEs, Oct.
1996, at 13 (discussing the costs of avoiding tort liability).
One-Term Tort Reform Tale
to imagine an industry or profession that would not qualify.
Second, the costs imposed on manufacturers by the product liabil-
ity system serve an important deterrent function. Professor Carl
T. Bogus notes that while "the common law has receded in
importance," product liability "has become an essential partici-
pant in promoting public safety."10' 1 Professor Bogus observes
generally that if the "common law has become underappreciated
by legislators," then the viability of the product liability system
is at extreme risk.10 2 Adopting federal legislation undercutting
state product liability law, such as the biomaterials proposals,
would eviscerate consumer protections.
Others who have studied the tort and product liability system
for decades share these concerns. Professor Michael J. Saks
argues that the tort system "may be doing a better job as a
deterrent than it usually receives credit for."' 03 After completing
a thorough empirical study of the tort system, Professor Saks
drew several limited'0 4 conclusions: only a "tiny fraction" of
accidental deaths and injuries actually become claims; large loss
claims and negotiated settlements actually appear to be "under
compensated" at the end of the process; and jury awards are
"remarkably predictable?"'10 For biomaterials producers, then, the
risks of financial ruin are minimal.
101 Supra note 15, at 87. Professor Bogus notes that, at present, the product liability
system is functioning despite the general "war on the common law." Id. at 70 n.380.
In conjunction with effective regulation, product liability law provides "an essential
auxiliary." Id. at 87.
102d. at 70.
103 Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1286 (1992).
104Professor Saks determined that existing studies are insufficient to permit global
characterizations about the way the system functions: "We canot draw rigorous or even
reasonable conclusions about ... the litigation system... !' Id. at 1288.
1051d. at 1287-89. Saks also concluded that the system as a whole is more "efficient
and effective as a deterrent" than as a method of compensation, and that there is an
unfortunate likelihood that some "reforms will produce effects contrary to the inten-
tions of their makers"; indeed, some already have. Id. See, e.g., Bruce Glassner, An
Affidavit With No Merit, N.J. L.J., Sept. 2, 1996, at 27 (discussing the use of affidavits
of merit as a malpractice tort limitation mechanism and finding "as with so many other
recent tort reform measures, the affidavit of merit will fail to achieve its desired
purpose...."); Steven R. Berger, The Medical Malpractice Crises: How One State
Reacted, 11 FORUM 64, 78-79 (1975) (finding that tort reform measures failed to limit
increases in Florida medical malpractice premiums).
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C. Fear of the U.S. Legal System Is Not a Basis for
Legislating Unaccountability
In response to the claim that the actual risk of liability is
small,106 supporters of biomaterials immunity trotted out the ill-
fated Vitek jaw implant as their star witness.1 07 When the implant
failed, allegedly fragmenting in the mouths of numerous pa-
tients, the victims sued not only Vitek, the producer of the im-
plant, but also DuPont, the raw materials supplier. 0 In 1990, the
FDA, in one of its better moments, ordered Vitek to inform oral
surgeons that the implant had a tendency to fragment. 09 The
FDA subsequently recalled the product. In his opening remarks
to the Congressional hearings held thereafter, subcommittee chair-
man Ted Weiss said, "[tihere is evidence that the overwhelming
majority of grafts and implants will fail if they haven't already." 0
106Claims against raw materials providers often founder on the notion that raw
materials are not inherently unreasonably dangerous, and that only after conversion for
use in implants or similar products does risk appear. Given that raw materials producers
know the uses to which their products are put (tolerances and specifications are spelled
out in contracts) and also profit from the sale of the end product, some responsibility
by them for product failure seems reasonable. Nevertheless, courts have been uniformly
disinclined to impose such liability. "[Tihere is little social utility in placing the burden
on a manufacturer of component parts or supplier of raw materials of guarding against
injuries caused by the final product when the component parts or raw materials
themselves were not unreasonably dangerous" Bond v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
868 P2d 1114, 1120-21 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). Based on this policy, raw materials
suppliers do not have conventional duties, such as the duty to warn of a reasonably
foreseeable risk. See Welsh v. Bowling Elec. Mach., Inc., 875 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994); Doll v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 01-95-00375-CV, 1997
WL 69862 (Tex. App. Feb. 20, 1997); Zaza v. Marquess, 675 A.2d 620 (N.J. 1996).
When the raw materials provider is also the manufacturer, standard negligence/due care
obligations attach. See Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1970).
""Supra note 100 and accompanying text. See In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig.,
872 R Supp. 1019 (D. Minn. 1995); Frederick D. Baker, Effects of Product Liability
on Bulk Suppliers of Biomaterials, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J., 455, 457 (1995) ("Vitek,
Inc. produced temporomandibular jaw (TMJ) implants made of Proplast, a material
developed by Vitek. Proplast contained a number of raw ingredients, including Du-
Pont's Teflon. It was alleged that Proplast deteriorated after implantation, causing
serious and painful injury, and that the deterioration occurred because Teflon is
unsuitable for use in implants.").
10 8 See Baker, supra note 107, at 457 ("Many lawsuits were filed [against Vitek], and
Vitek rapidly ran out of both its assets and its insurance coverage. After Vitek filed for
bankruptcy protection, plaintiffs' attention shifted to ... DuPont").
109See Berry v. United States, No. 94-7173, 1995 WL 434831, at **1 (10th Cir. July
25, 1995) (pointing out the FDA "Safety Alert" issued Dec. 1990 with respect to TMJ
implants manufactured by Vitek).
11OAre FDA and NIH Ignoring the Dangers of TMJ (Jaw) Implants? Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Hum. Resources and Intergovernmental Rel. of the House Comin. On
Gov't Operations, 102d Cong. (1992).
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Nevertheless, on February 20, 1997 the Court of Appeals of
Texas affirmed summary judgments that had been granted in
favor of DuPont."'
From a consumer perspective, it is hard to see a string of
victories by DuPont as grounds for a grant of federal immu-
nity.112 Further, DuPont's success is not surprising, given the
preferential position that materials suppliers enjoy in the legal
system. As is the case in many areas of torts, the case law and
literature have shifted in favor of producers and manufacturers.
Plaintiffs now face nearly insurmountable difficulties when seek-
ing relief against biomaterials suppliers.11 3
As the capacity of the substantive law to redress the harms of
injured persons erodes, 1 4 so too do plaintiffs' evidentiary op-
tions.115 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,11 6 the Su-
preme Court limited the plaintiff's ability to introduce expert
testimony based on statistical and empirical evidence unless the
plaintiff met fairly demanding guidelines regarding scientific
reliability and validity. The Court promulgated factors that trial
judges should consider in deciding whether to allow expert tes-
timony, including whether the expert evidence is based on clear
scientific knowledge, has been subject to peer review, is capable
"'See Cason v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 01-94-01191-CV, 1997 WL
69858, at *17 (Tex. App. Feb. 20, 1997); Doll v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No.
01-95-00375 CV, 1997 WL 69862, at *18 (Tex. App. Feb. 20, 1997) (finding that
DuPont "did not have a duty to warn").
112See supra notes 93-96, 108, and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 93, 94, and 112; see also Kealoha v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 82 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1995), for a thorough treatment of the duty to warn in the
Vitek situation. That case held that DuPont, as a raw products supplier, had no duty
to warn TMJ recipients, and was entitled to assert raw materials supplier defenses to
negligence and products liability claims. The court found that DuPont's awareness of
the risk was easily documented, taking notice of a 1984 conference attended by DuPont
staff in which the fragmentation potential of the Vitek implant was a central topic. The
staff in attendance submitted a memorandum to the management of DuPont regarding
the problems with the product. See id. at 895-98.
t14For example, the Court of Appeals in Texas, a state with a history of forceful
consumer-oriented product liability law, recently declared that a component part
manufacturer producing a product that conforms with the purchaser's specifications
cannot be held strictly liable, outside of a demonstrated defect in the component part.
See Molina v. Kelco Tool & Die, Inc., 904 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. App. 1995).
15 See Michael H. Gottesman, Should State Courts Impose a Reliability Threshold?,
TRIAL, Sept. 1997, at 20 (arguing that changes in the field of evidence at the federal
level are harsh and that states should reject new rules that make it difficult, if not
impossible, for plaintiffs to succeed in a product liability case involving scientific or
technical data).
116509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (holding that, under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
a trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
not only relevant, but reliable).
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of independent testing, and has an established error analysis
pattern.11 7
Predictably, in a recent biomaterials case, Cabrera v. Cordis,"18
a federal court blocked the use of four expert witnesses proposed
by the plaintiff, basing its decision on Daubert. As these meas-
ures mature at the state level, there is at least the hope that the
states, the laboratories of tort law, will restore balance to the
system.1 9 If, however, federal legislators enact laws that pre-
clude consumers from pursuing legitimate claims either in state
or federal court, powerful and essential consumer protection op-
tions may be destroyed.
IV. CONCLUSION
All too often, courts, legislators, and scholars assess tort re-
form in purely economic terms, i.e., whether tort law promotes
safety most efficiently, or whether market forces optimize safety
without the external costs of the litigation process. While this
debate is reasonable, its terms, unfortunately, have expanded too
far. The entitlement to due care has become negotiable, and
industry interests have capitalized on the fear of those whose
well-being is in their hands.
While it is too early to track statistically the impact of the
Volunteer Protection Act, millions of individuals entitled to due
care from those who provided volunteer service prior to June 19,
1997, are now without that personally enforceable entitlement.
Children, the homeless, victims of natural disasters, clients or
patients in legal and medical clinics, and many others, have lost
an expectation of consequence.
Beyond the rhetoric and natural inclination to assist charities,
virtually no facts were placed before Congress to justify the
deprivation of the entitlement to due care. The record, in both
the House and Senate, lacks any showing that volunteers face
undue tort liability, that the number of volunteers has declined,
"
7 See id. at 593-94. Daubert expands the precautionary impact of Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, compounding the challenges a plaintiff faces in biomaterials
cases where there is a good chance that the totality of the plaintiff's case will rest on
empirical data only available through expert opinion testimony.
118945 . Supp. 209 (D. Nev. 1996) (finding that four expert witnesses proposed by
the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Daubert standard for reliability).
191f the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1997, H.R. 872, 105th Cong., had
become law, the ability of the states to evolve standards would have ended, since the
bill was written to preempt state law in this field.
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or that individual volunteers who seek protection from personal
liability must cope with excessive insurance rates. Instead, the
record contained the same slogans, tirades against trial lawyers,
and anecdotes about egregious cases (that either never existed,
were reversed on appeal, or settled) that have distorted the tort
reform debate for two decades. This time around, the sleight-of-
hand succeeded, perhaps because cynical lobbyists mustered the
right combination of popular charities, media stars, and earnest
families suffering personal loss.
It is now the task of the legal community to determine the
reach of this law. Courts will have to decide whether volunteer
physicians and pro bono attorneys who perform negligently will
be liable for malpractice; they will have to decide whether coaches
and teachers who are negligent and, as a result, harm children,
will be held accountable. The plain language of the new law
makes it unlikely that victims of this type of misconduct can
hold miscreants personally accountable. This is not the type of
legislative signal that inspires.
As to the matter of proposed immunity for the sellers of
biomaterials, Congress resisted their plea, presumably uncon-
vinced by their claims of a looming crisis. Just as it is too early
to determine the consequences of volunteer immunity, it is also
too early to discern the effect of denying immunity to biomate-
rials suppliers. Should providers of raw materials vanish, it would
not be reasonable to ascribe causality to a tort system that con-
sistently protects the interests of raw materials producers in
every state and federal court.
If a future session of Congress sees fit to grant such immunity,
consumers of biomaterials products will not find their position
bettered. Persons injured when a company knowingly supplies
materials unsuited for the contemplated medical use will not
benefit from a deprivation of their right of redress against those
who harmed them. Such a deprivation would constitute yet an-
other "dark side of tort reform."' 2 0
120 See Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching For Racial
Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 761, 791 (1996) (coining the phrase "dark side of tort
reform").
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